The arrival of H5 avian influenza in Esperance is a serious biosecurity challenge.

It is also a real-world test of whether Australia’s preparedness measures can actually be deployed when they are needed most.

So far, that test has exposed a frustrating truth: sometimes the biggest obstacle to responding to a national threat isn’t a lack of expertise, commitment or funding.

It’s bureaucracy.

Cape Le Grand National Park has become ground zero for Australia’s first confirmed cases of avian influenza.

Local wildlife carers, veterinarians, volunteers, Aboriginal ranger groups and conservation organisations have responded with remarkable dedication.

They are doing everything possible to protect our unique wildlife and contain the spread of the virus.

Yet one of the region’s purpose-built biosecurity assets remains sidelined because of a certification issue involving an ablution block.

As reported in recent weeks, Esperance Wildlife Hospital has facilities specifically designed to manage wildlife disease outbreaks.

Staff and volunteers have even rehearsed biosecurity responses to the highly pathogenic avian influenza.

However, one key component of the facility — a washdown and amenities area intended to prevent contamination spreading beyond the site — cannot currently be used because the ablution block does not meet Australian certification requirements.

The irony is painful. The very facility designed to help manage a biosecurity emergency is being held back during an actual biosecurity emergency.

Let me be clear. Building standards and compliance requirements exist for good reasons.

When facilities are handling potentially infected animals and contaminated equipment, biosecurity protocols must also be robust.

No one is arguing standards should be ignored.

But government also needs the capacity to exercise common sense.

My understanding is that the Commonwealth has already provided WA with funding to respond to biosecurity threats such as avian influenza, including support for essential facilities and infrastructure.

The resources exist. The need is obvious. The threat is real and immediate.

Surely the priority should be determining what is required to bring the facility into compliance as quickly as possible, or examining what temporary approvals, exemptions or ministerial discretion may be available during an active response.

Preparedness is not measured by the number of plans sitting on a shelf.

It is measured by whether the people responding on the ground have the resources, training, equipment and support they need when challenges arise.

In Esperance today, wildlife carers are handling sick and potentially infected birds.

Veterinarians are providing expertise.

Conservation groups are monitoring impacts on significant bird populations.

Concerned residents are scrambling to seek guidance on how to prepare and where to find relevant information.

Meanwhile, a facility built to support exactly this type of response remains caught in regulatory limbo.

The situation highlights a broader problem facing Australia: compliance systems that were designed to manage risk can sometimes become barriers to managing risk.

This isn’t only a biosecurity issue. Across regional Australia, local communities regularly encounter layers of certification, approvals and regulatory requirements that delay practical outcomes long after common sense says action should be taken.

The challenge is compounded by Esperance’s location.

Along Australia’s southern coastline, Esperance is effectively the only major regional centre between Albany and the South Australian border.

When compliance issues arise, there is not an army of building surveyors, certifiers and specialist inspectors available at short notice.

Regional communities operate in a very different environment to Perth, yet government systems are too often built around metropolitan assumptions.

What might be resolved in days in the city can take weeks or months in the regions.

The situation also highlights a broader problem affecting regional Australia: compliance systems that have become increasingly complex, costly and disconnected from practical outcomes.

That is why the Coalition has committed to slashing the National Construction Code to reduce the cost and complexity of building across Australia.

Introduced in 1988 at just 209 pages and focused primarily on safety, the code has since ballooned to about 2350 pages.

The Coalition will preserve core safety standards while stripping out unnecessary gold-plating that has made building more expensive and harder than it needs to be.

As a first step, we will prioritise unwinding the 2022 changes, including the seven-star energy efficiency requirements and minimum accessibility provisions.

Standards matter, so does safety and accountability, but Esperance demonstrates what can happen when compliance frameworks become so cumbersome that they stand in the way of practical solutions during a genuine emergency.

But there must also be flexibility when communities are confronting urgent challenges.

In Esperance, we are not talking about a commercial development seeking to cut corners. We are talking about a wildlife biosecurity facility supporting the response to Australia’s first confirmed outbreak of H5.

What concerns many people locally is not simply the certification issue itself, but what it says about the broader response.

If a facility specifically established to help manage avian influenza cannot be operationalised during an active avian influenza outbreak, Australians are entitled to ask some difficult questions about preparedness.

As I told Federal Parliament recently: “This is not preparedness, it’s improvisation under pressure.”

While ministers continue to assure Australians that governments are ready for this challenge, the experience in Esperance suggests there remains a considerable gap between policy and practical outcomes.

The people on the ground deserve better.

Ultimately, this debate is about more than a toilet block.

It is about whether governments are prepared to trust local expertise, empower frontline responders and cut through red tape when circumstances demand it.

Esperance has given Australia an opportunity to learn valuable lessons about responding to H5. We should use that opportunity.

By bringing together government agencies, conservation experts, industry groups, wildlife organisations and local communities, we can strengthen Australia’s response to avian influenza and future biosecurity threats.

But the first lesson seems obvious.

When a community is facing a genuine biosecurity threat, government should focus on solving compliance problems — not becoming one.

Rick Wilson is the Liberal Member of the House of Representatives for O’Connor.